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Abstract 
I present a dynamic public good experiment where subjects endogenously determine 
contribution productivity by engaging in costly investment. Subjects complete two sequences of 
ten rounds of decision making. The level of contribution productivity builds from round to round 
as a function of investment. After investing, subjects decide how much of their remaining 
endowments to contribute to the public good. I examine if there is a learning effect between the 
sequences and if subjects are able to behave close to the social optimum. I observe that in 
Sequence 2, the average rate of investment and the average total profits are closer to the social 
optimum, indicating that subjects are cooperating and learning the incentives to invest in the 
public good.  
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Executive Summary 
Public goods games have been studied by economists for decades with numerous 
variations to test subjects’ behavior in response to certain treatments. Traditional public goods 
games from the 1980s were conducted via telephone and mail. Participants in public goods 
experiments were divided into groups of typically four or five and each given the same 
endowment. Subjects then had to decide between keeping their endowment in a private account 
(for themselves) and contributing some portion of their endowments to a group account (the 
public good). The sum of the group members’ contributions to the group account were multiplied 
by a constant, the Marginal per Capita Return (MPCR), and each subject’s payoff was this 
amount in addition to any amount kept in the subject’s private account. Everyone benefits from 
the group account whether or not they contributed; this is the basis for the free-rider problem.  
The free-rider theory predicts that all rational people will follow the Nash Equilibrium 
and contribute zero. This is because keeping one dollar (or one unit of whatever currency is 
being used) guarantees the individual that one dollar, but contributing one dollar to the group 
account only yields one times the MPCR to the contributor. Although fully contributing to a 
public good is optimal (because it results in the highest collective payoff), theory predicts that 
people will free-ride. This exemplifies the public goods problem; individual self-interest is at 
odds with group interest (Ledyard, 1995). In the literature, it has been found that there are two 
scenarios. There is “strong free-riding,” where subjects contribute close to nothing, but “weak 
free-riding” is the more common observation, where subjects contribute sub-optimal amounts. 
The public goods game presented in this project is the first dynamic public goods game 
with endogenous contribution productivity (i.e., subjects vote on contribution productivity 
(Marginal per Capita Return) in every round and this number carries from round to round). 
Fourteen sessions were conducted with eight participants each. In each session, there were two 
sequences, each with ten rounds of decision making. Furthermore, each round had two stages – 
the investment stage and the contribution stage. This gives 2240 individual observations and 560 
group observations. A treatment used in this experiment was Strangers vs. Partners; half of the 
sessions had the groups fixed for the two sequences and half of the sessions had the groups 
rematched for the second sequence. This treatment was implemented to observe the effects of 
changing group members on the subjects’ investment and contribution patterns.  
There was a learning effect between sequence one and two. Specifically, subjects 
generally improved in terms of investments, absolute contributions, and total profits in sequence 
two compared to sequence one. It was also found that subjects were cooperative throughout the 
experiment, which counters the strong free-rider hypothesis that subjects will contribute zero. 
Increasing cooperation is a rare observation in public goods literature. 
This experiment offers insight on how subjects behave when given the option to 
determine their own contribution productivity for producing public goods, and my results 
indicate that people are more willing to cooperate when they choose their own investment levels 
compared to when there is an exogenous taxation from an outside party (e.g., a government). 
Based on my findings, I make the following recommendations: 
1. Let people choose the productivity of their public goods. 
2. Educate people on the incentives to invest and contribute to public goods. 
3. Publish a public record of community contributions. 
These recommendations for real world policies are aimed towards increasing productivity of 
public goods such as national defense, air quality, and roads and highways. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable goods that everyone can benefit from. 
This means that the use of a public good by one person does not limit another person from also 
using that public good (non-rival) and no one is excluded from consumption of the good (non-
excludable). Examples of public goods are national defense, clean air, and roads and highways; 
everyone benefits from these and the use of the goods by one does not prevent another from also 
benefiting. 
Specifically, in the case of roads and highways, there are initiatives to improve road 
safety. Measures include improving lighting, installing traffic signals, and removing roadside 
hazards. The improvement of road safety conditions benefit everyone in the community – and 
the use of a safer road by one driver does not exclude another driver from driving on that same 
road and benefiting of its better safety conditions. However, in order for a city to improve its 
road conditions for drivers, this requires investment at both the institutional and the individual 
level. A city government may pass a policy for all drivers to turn on their headlights within thirty 
minutes of sunrise and sunset, but unless everyone cooperates to the new policy, the number of 
accidents involving unseen oncoming traffic might not change. People within the community 
must oblige to the road safety policies of the community not to endanger themselves or others. 
For an institution, in this case the city government, to be able to pay for upgrades and new 
installations (e.g., signage, lighting, line marking), they must tax the community to obtain 
funding. Therefore, because individuals must oblige to these road safety measures and provide 
funding through taxes, it can be argued that individual “investments” determine the productivity 
of public goods (Wen, 2014). 
In my version of the public goods game, I conduct lab experiments to investigate how 
individuals make decisions regarding the allocation of money – specifically, how individuals 
behave regarding investing in contribution productivity and subsequently contributing funds to 
provision of the public good. I ran fourteen sessions in the Social Science and Policies Studies 
Department’s Experimental Economics Laboratory with eight participants in each session. The 
participants of each session were randomly divided into two groups of four and subjects 
remained anonymous to each other throughout the experiment. The experiment consisted of two 
tasks: sequences one and two. Each sequence was a series of ten rounds of decision making. 
Furthermore, each round was made up of two stages: the investment stage and the contribution 
stage.  
The investment stage provided observations at the group level, because all group 
members invested the same amount, which was determined using the median voter rule. The 
investments that the subjects made determined how much they would benefit from the public 
good in the following stage; their investments built the Marginal per Capita Return (MPCR) 
which carried from round to round. The contribution stage that followed produced individual 
observations, because contributions were not mandatory; the subjects decided how much of their 
remaining endowments to contribute to the public good. The sum of contributions to the public 
good was multiplied by the MPCR. This total and what they kept for themselves was their payoff 
for that round. The subjects received a monetary payoff based on their decisions, giving the 
subjects incentive to take the decision making seriously. 
The data shows a learning effect between sequences one and two (i.e., subjects generally 
did better in terms of investments, contributions, and their total profits in sequence two). Instead 
of the usual observation from public goods games in the literature, where subjects free ride with 
repetition, I found subjects became more cooperative throughout the experiment. Also, my 
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experiment did not support the free-rider hypothesis – that all rational subjects follow the Nash 
Equilibrium and contribute zero – instead, subjects consistently contributed at least thirty percent 
of their remaining endowments in the contribution stage (on average). 
The public goods literature is extensive; public good experiments have been studied for 
several decades by economists. The traditional public goods experiments took weeks to complete 
because the experiments were done via mail or telephone. Traditional experiments are similar to 
the contribution stage of my experiment – subjects have an endowment and can decide how to 
allocate the endowment between their private accounts (keeping it for themselves) or 
contributing to the public good (the group account) and the sum of group members’ contributions 
are similarly multiplied by a MPCR. However, in traditional experiments, the MPCR does not 
change whereas in my experiment, the MPCR changes from round to round (based on subjects’ 
investments).  
There have been many variations on the public goods game by implementing group size 
treatments, MPCR treatments, punishment treatments, communication treatments, and etc. 
Recently, there have been public good experiments with dynamic links (Battaglini et al, 2012) 
which observed economies with reversibility and economies with irreversibility. Also, there have 
been experiments that incorporate endogenous contribution productivity. Isaac and Norton 
(2010) assigned the role of a manager who determined the group’s MPCR and in 2013 examined 
the results when subjects endogenously chose a tax rate compared to an exogenous tax rate from 
a government. Xi Wen (2014) also ran experiments where subjects endogenously determined an 
investment towards the MPCR via voting. So far, there have not been versions that incorporate 
both a dynamic link (something that carries from round to round) and endogenous contribution 
productivity until my experiment, which has an MPCR that builds and subjects voting on their 
contribution productivity. 
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Chapter II: Background 
Public good experiments have been studied for several decades by behavioral and 
experimental economists since Paul A. Samuelson developed the theory of public goods in 1954. 
This background chapter provides results on the numerous versions that have been conducted 
since the theory was created. 
2.1 – Standard Public Goods Games 
Experimenters typically recruit undergraduate students from universities. The participants 
are divided into small groups that usually consist of four or five members. The identity of one’s 
group members remains unknown throughout the experiment and there is limited interaction 
between subjects. Typically, there is no face-to face communication; for example, when 
experiments were first conducted between the 1980s and 1990s, subjects reported their decisions 
via telephone or mail. In present times, subjects are in a lab setting and use private computer 
stations to make their decisions; therefore, subjects do not discuss during the duration of the 
experiment. 
Subjects participate in a series of rounds of decision making. At the beginning of each 
round, the subjects are given the same endowment (i.e., tokens or lab dollars) which they must 
decide how to allocate between a private or public account. Any contribution to the private 
account is simply kept by the individual, but payoffs from the public account depend on 
contributions from other group members. The sum of contributions in the public account – also 
referred to as the group account – is multiplied by a constant, the Marginal per Capita Return 
(MPCR). The resulting amount is received by all group members regardless of whether or not 
they contributed to the public account. Thus, a subject’s total payoff from a round is: 
 
πi = ωi – ci + M Σ cj 
where: 
πi = the individual’s payoff for the round 
ωi = the individual’s endowment for the round 
ci = the individual’s contribution to the group account 
M = MPCR 
cj = the other members’ contributions to the group account. 
As mentioned, everyone in the group benefits from the public account even if they only 
contribute to their private accounts (i.e., did not contribute to the group account but kept their 
endowments for themselves). This is the incentive to free-ride. The free-rider hypothesis is one 
of the most widely accepted propositions in the public goods literature (Marwell and Ames, 
1981). This hypothesis is that all rational people will follow the Nash Equilibrium, the dominant 
strategy, and contribute zero to the group account. This is because contributing one token to the 
private account will guarantee the individual the one token in his/her payoff, but contributing one 
token to the group account yields only one times the MPCR to the contributor. The dilemma 
occurs when MPCR is less than one. Specifically, if 
1
/n<MPCR<1, where n is the number of 
members in a group, contributing to the public good is beneficial for the group but not for the 
individual because it yields less than the guaranteed payoff from the private account (if MPCR 
was greater than one, contributing to the group account would yield a higher payoff than the 
private account). Free-riding would allow the individual to keep his/her own endowment but still 
benefit from the good; however, fully contributing to the group account is optimal because it 
 
 
9 
 
results in the highest collective payoff (Wen, 2014) . This is referred to as the public goods 
problem because individual self-interest is at odds with group interest (Ledyard, 1995). 
 Although the hypothesis is that all subjects will contribute zero, past experiments have 
countered the theory. Instead, there seems to be two scenarios: strong free-riding (subjects 
contribute close to nothing) and weak free-riding (subjects contribute only sub-optimal amounts; 
they contribute neither zero nor their entire endowment). Generally, experimenters have found 
subjects to contribute between 40 to 60 percent of the group optimum (Ledyard, 1995); thus, 
weak free-riding is more common than strong free-riding. 
 Other common observations in standard public goods experiments is decay in 
contributions from 40 to 60 percent in beginning rounds to near free-riding towards the end. This 
is suspected to be due to learning the dominant strategy through repetition. 
 There have been many variations of the standard public goods experiments to address the 
free-rider hypothesis and reasons why some subjects contribute at all instead of follow the 
dominant strategy. 
2.2 – Variations on Public Good Experiments 
 Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames (1979, 1980, and 1981) used different treatments to 
test the free-rider problem in a series of experiments. In 1979, Marwell and Ames tested the 
effects of group size (large and small), (un)equal distribution of interest, and (un)equal 
distribution of resources in the group on subjects’ contributions. Marwell and Ames used a 
“natural setting,” therefore all interaction was via telephone and mail. They had five hypotheses: 
two were regarding strong and weak free-riding (there will be either close to zero or sub-optimal 
contributions in the group exchange), two were regarding interest (groups where average interest 
exceeded cost were predicted to have the highest levels of provision because interested members 
have more motivation to ensure the good’s provision, and only small groups with unequal 
interest and resources will substantially invest in the group exchange), and the final hypothesis 
was that small groups will invest more in the public account than large groups.  
The most significant finding was the lack of support for the strong free rider hypothesis; 
the mean investment for a typical group of four was approximately 57% of the available 
resources (41% contribution if subjects with greater endowments are excluded), only 13% of the 
subjects contributed nothing (Marwell and Ames, 1979). Also, it was found that small groups 
with unequal interest and unequal resources contributed more than small groups with unequal 
interest and equal resources. Lastly, although small groups tended to have higher mean 
investments, the differences between small and large groups were not significant. A possible 
explanation for the lack of support for the strong free rider hypothesis was that most subjects 
believed there was a “fair” contribution to be made; 88% of the subjects believed that a 
contribution of at least 40% was considered fair and more than one third of the subjects believed 
investing all of one’s resources was fair. 
Marwell and Ames’ 1979 experiment results were questioned. Therefore, in 1980 they 
replicated the previous experiments to address the three most pressing questions received from 
the last series. Study I was regarding the provision point (the point where dramatic payoffs are 
increased dramatically); it was argued that with a provision point individuals expected to have 
higher returns and therefore invested more money, thus the provision point was removed. Study 
II was regarding higher stakes; with low stakes from the previous experiments, subjects may 
have been willing to take more risks, therefore, return increased from 1 cent per token to 5 cents. 
Study III was regarding experience; subjects only made the decision once and lack of 
understanding/information could have been the reason they invested, thus subjects who 
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participated in Study I were the subjects for this study as well. In each experiment, even with the 
change in parameters, subjects continued to contribute to the group accounts; subjects 
contributed approximately 51% of the available tokens. There were no significant differences 
between this series of experiments and the previous ones; in fact the contribution averages were 
very similar. 
 To test the validity of the strong free-rider hypothesis further, Marwell and Ames 
conducted another series of eleven public good experiments in 1981. The eleven independent 
variables studied were: 
1) Skewed resources and interest – one group had skewed resources (165 tokens vs. 405 
tokens), another had skewed return (2.25% vs. 0.92%), and another group had both resources 
and return skewed. 
2) Provision point – after 8000 tokens, returns increased dramatically. 
3) Small groups – groups comprised of only four group members. 
4) Experienced subjects – subjects who had already participated were the subjects again. 
5) High stakes – higher return. 
7,8,9) Feedback – there were two opportunities to invest, subjects could base their investments  
      on group’s responses to the first phase. 
10) Manipulated feedback – subjects were given incorrect information regarding the group’s        
      investments. 
11) Non-divisibility – the public good had to be consumed collectively. 
12) Economics graduate students – instead of using undergraduate students, the subjects were 
      graduate students. 
Surprisingly, in almost every situation, the mean percentage of resources invested 
remained between 40-60%. The strong version of the free rider hypothesis was contradicted by 
every experiment and the weak version was supported throughout. 
Marwell and Ames were two of the first economists to make variations on standard 
public good experiments, and the majority of their results were in opposition to the strong free-
rider hypothesis. Their data confirmed that subjects usually contribute and do not all free ride 
(Ledyard, 1995); many experimenters conducted experiments in direct response to Marwell and 
Ames in an attempt to show that their results were flawed. However, many other experimenters 
found divergent results regarding free-riding as well. For example, Isaac et al. (1984) had a wide 
range of results when testing strong vs. weak free-riding, effects of convergence with repetition, 
effects of changing MPCR, and amount of experience among subjects. 
 
2.2.1 Effects of MPCR on Public Good Experiments 
One of the experiments in response to Marwell and Ames was conducted by Mark Isaac 
and James Walker (1988); the two examined the relationship between group size and free-riding 
behavior. Two concepts studied were the marginal return to individuals from contributions to the 
public good and the number of group participants. The hypothesis was that “small” groups with 
four group members would be better able to provide public goods than “large” groups with ten 
group members - especially when driven by reductions in MPCR. 
A treatment used in this experiment was the altering of MPCR. Some groups had MPCR 
altered as the number of group members remained constant, some groups changed the amount of 
group members but kept MPCR constant, and some groups had a combination of altering both 
the amount of group members and MPCR. In half of the experiments, the first series had an 
MPCR of 0.3 and 0.75 the next; in the other 12 experiments the first series had an MPCR of 0.75 
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and 0.3 the next. Changes in any parameters or combination of parameters have consequences 
for the decision environment (Isaac and Walker, 1988). Therefore, in addition to lowering the 
endowments of groups with more members, the experimenters calculated these specific MPCRs 
of 0.3 and 0.75 to keep the total benefit of a token contributed the same in both group sizes and 
to keep the payoffs balanced.  
An observation was that although larger groups had lower average contributions, the 
difference was not statistically significant (Isaac and Walker, 1988). It was also found that 
lowering the MPCR significantly increased free riding behavior; on the other hand, a higher 
MPCR led to a greater efficiency in public goods provision. Isaac and Walker’s study of the 
effects of MPCR is a very important component of my own experiment. Their experiment was 
the first intragroup comparison of the effects of MPCR on provision of public goods (Isaac and 
Walker, 1988). Although they did not use a dynamic link between the rounds, their findings that 
higher MPCRs lead to greater efficiency exemplify the incentive to invest in increasing MPCR in 
my experiment. 
2.3 Explanations for Observed Behavior in Public Good Experiments 
 In addition to creating numerous variations of the standard public goods experiment, 
researchers also attempt to uncover the reasons for subjects’ behaviors – their free-riding or their 
decisions to contribute.  
2.3.1 Explanations for Free-Riding 
James Andreoni (1988) investigates the effects of strategies and learning in public good 
experiments. Observations from past studies provide mixed support for free riding; subjects 
generally contribute to the public good at levels between the Pareto efficient (i.e., the social 
optimum which is all of their tokens) and the free riding levels (none of their tokens). When 
there is repetition, contributions tend to decay towards the free riding level.  To explain these 
results, specifically why subjects cooperate and why contributions decay, Andreoni has two 
hypotheses. First, repeated play allows subjects to learn the incentives, which is not possible in 
single-shot games. Second, subjects might develop multi-period strategies that allow for 
cooperative behavior. 
The designs of the experiments were subtractive: subjects participated in a repeated-play 
environment but the possibility of playing strategically was eliminated by changing group 
composition. In the Strangers condition, subjects played the public goods game ten times but 
since their group members changed, subjects could not try to conceal their rationality and play 
strategically. On the other hand, in the Partners condition, the groups were fixed. Therefore, 
subjects could play strategically; thus, it was expected that contributions by Partners would be 
greater than those of Strangers. 
There was also a ‘restart’ after ten rounds. If learning is primarily responsible for decay, 
neither condition should be affected because Partners should continue where they left off since 
their groups were still fixed and Stranger groups were still being changed. If either group was 
affected by decay, this would imply that learning alone cannot explain decay. 
The exact opposite of the strategic play hypothesis occurred and contributions by 
Strangers were significantly higher than those of Partners. Strangers were only 
temporarily/weakly affected by the restart and partners were strongly affected – contributions 
increased sharply from the last round of the original game to the first round of the restart game 
(Croson, 1996). The overall results of these experiments were that the second hypothesis of 
strategic play could not be supported and that learning plays little or no role in explaining decay. 
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Because neither the learning nor the strategy hypotheses were supported as explanations 
of decay in Andreoni (1988), Rachel Croson (1996) replicated the experiment but only found 
support for the strategies hypothesis. She found the restart effect to be significant at the 5% level 
in the Partners condition (an average contribution of 4.54 tokens in the last round of the original 
game and 11.54 tokens in the first period of the restart game) and insignificant in the Strangers 
condition (although there was an increase from 2.58 tokens in round ten to 6.21 in the restart, it 
was not enough to be significant), thus the learning hypothesis was not supported. Unlike 
Andreoni’s experiments, the strategies hypothesis was supported because subjects in the Partner 
condition contributed significantly more than in the Strangers condition. The difference between 
contributions was highly significant over the first ten rounds in the original game, the ten rounds 
in the restart game, and over all twenty rounds (Croson, 1996). Croson also found contributions 
in the Partners and Strangers treatments to converge towards the end which further supports the 
strategies hypothesis.  A possible explanation for the differences observed between Andreoni 
(1988) and Croson (1996) is the significantly higher variance of individual contributions in the 
Partners treatment than in the Strangers treatment (Croson, 1996).  
Andreoni and Croson (2008) collaborated on a paper to review other economists’ 
replications of their variation of the public goods experiment. Four studies found more 
cooperation among Strangers like Andreoni (1988), five found more cooperation among Partners 
like Croson (1996), and four failed to find any differences at all (Andreoni and Croson, 2008). 
As Croson states, the differing results found in these studies highlight the importance of 
replication for economic experiments. 
2.3.2 Explanations for Cooperation 
 Cooperation implies that subjects are not rational nor completely selfish because they are 
not playing the dominant strategy that would maximize their personal payoffs. James Andreoni 
attempted to figure if cooperation is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow in a series of 
experiments in 1995. He attempted to separate kindness and confusion to investigate the 
persistence of cooperation in public good experiments. 
The experiment strengthens the controls that subtract out incentives for kindness which 
makes subjects more likely to choose the dominant strategy of free-riding. Without kindness, 
confusion is the only other explanation for cooperation. The first hypothesis was that subjects 
could have a taste for cooperation outside of the experiment which influenced their behavior in 
the lab experiment. The second hypothesis was that subjects are unable to grasp the true 
incentives of the public goods experiment. There were three conditions: 
1) Regular condition – this is the standard public goods experiment. 
2) Rank condition – subjects played the standard public goods game but their final payoffs were 
not equivalent to their earnings from each round of the experiment. Instead, subjects were 
paid based on how they rank in comparison to the other members within their group. Thus, 
there is no incentive for cooperation. This condition subtracts kindness and measures 
confusion.  
3) RegRank condition – subjects are given information on their ranks but are paid according to 
their experimental earnings. This condition measures kindness. 
The expectation was that the amount of contributions from the Regular condition was to be the 
most cooperative and subjects from the Rank condition to be the least cooperative. The 
differences in mean contributions across all three conditions were significant. Rank subjects free 
ride the most and Regular subjects free ride the least. The differences between the three 
conditions were also statistically significant. On average, cooperation is 43% kindness and 57% 
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confusion. The findings of these experiments indicate future research should “focus on 
developing reliable predictive models of charitable and altruistic behavior (Andreoni, 1995).” 
 Paul Ferraro and Christain Vossler (2010) also designed experiments focusing on the 
causes and effects of confusion. They conducted four experiments: 
1) Design of Goereet et al. (2002) – a static experiment where it is studied how changes in the 
MPCR and group size affect contributions; confused subjects behave like pure altruists. The 
experimenters found that 50% of contributions result from confusion. 
2) Design of Fischbacher et al. (2001) – this was a static experiment that applied the strategy 
method “which allows one to identify conditional cooperators and other player ‘types’ 
(Ferraro and Vossler, 2010).” 
3) Design of Isaac et al. (1984) – a repeated public goods game where there was an opportunity 
for learning. Once again, it was found that 50% of contributions results from confusion, 
confused players behave like conditional cooperators, and there was little evidence of 
learning. 
4) Design of Isaac et al. (1984) – the previous experiments had standard instructions, but in this 
version, the instructions were modified which used associative framing and a complete 
payoff matrix. They found that modifying the instructions dramatically reduced confusion 
and changed the distribution of contributions – there was a higher proportion of subjects who 
either free-ride or contribute their full endowment (Ferraro and Vossler 2010). 
Ferraro and Vossler concluded that it “is an important area for future research in experimental 
economics to identify the source and nature of the noises in experimental games and to develop 
ways to reduce this noise when it appears to be an artifact of the experimental design rather than 
part of the decision process being studied (Ferraro and Vossler, 2010).” 
2.4 Effects of Communication and Punishment on Public Good Experiments 
2.4.1 Communication 
 Aforesaid, communication in standard public goods experiments is very limited, and it 
remained limited in all variations until 1988 when Isaac and Walker examined the effects of 
face-to-face communication in altering free-riding behavior. They hypothesized that nonbinding 
communication would result in less free-riding, which leads to an increase in the efficiency of 
the public good’s provision. 
Design I had three experiment types: No Communication followed by No 
Communication (NC,NC), No Communication then Communication (NC,C), Communication 
then Communication (C,C). Groups who could communicate had the opportunity to speak to 
their three group members between periods then decided how much of their tokens to contribute 
to either an individual account or a public account, such as in a regular public goods experiment. 
In each of the 10 periods, contributions from the four groups who communicated dominated the 
six groups without communication.  
Design II used asymmetries in endowments and gave incomplete information; all 
experiments were C/NC. Ten periods had a significantly higher mean contribution for the 
communication experiments; 5/10 periods with asymmetric endowments had a statistically 
significant difference; no periods had statistically significant contributions with (in)complete 
information. Design III had different group sizes and MPCRs; the difference in mean 
contributions between groups with and without communication were statistically significant in 
9/10 periods.  
Overall, the studies support that communication significantly improves cooperation and 
is extremely effective in aiding groups to achieve optimal outcomes (Isaac and Walker, 1988). 
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Communication helped subjects understand the group profits from different allocations and 
helped build credibility. 
In my experiments, subjects do not communicate directly with one another. However, 
because there is an investment stage, subjects can inexplicitly indicate their willingness to 
cooperate during the contribution stages. For example, if the subjects invest high during the 
investment stage, they are probably interested in contributing – because otherwise it would be a 
waste of their endowment. 
 
2.4.2 Punishment 
Similar to communication, punishment has shown to be an effective treatment in 
decreasing free-riding behavior. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gaechter (2000) ran five sessions to test 
the effects of punishment on cooperation. Subjects were able to punish group members through 
the assignment of punishment points. Each punishment point subjects received reduced their 
payoff for that round by 10%. However, because of the costs for the punishers, traditional theory 
predicts that punishment opportunities would be irrelevant for contribution behavior and results 
would be the same with and without punishment (i.e., if rationality and selfishness are common 
knowledge, cooperation and punishment would never be part of a sub-game perfect equilibrium 
(Fehr and Gaechter, 2000)). The main objective was to see if subjects were capable of both 
achieving and maintaining cooperation in the punishment condition (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). 
Out of the five sessions, sessions 1-3 were given the Stranger condition (where group 
composition changed after each round) and sessions 4-5 had the Partner treatment (group 
composition remained fixed). Both treatments had ten periods with punishment and ten periods 
without punishment. To test for spillover effects, some sessions began with the punishment 
condition and ended with no-punishment while some began with no-punishment and ended with 
punishment.  
Observed results were that punishment caused a large rise in the average contribution 
levels; in the Stranger treatment, contribution rates were up to 58% of the endowment (Fehr and 
Gaechter, 2000). Differences between no-punishment and punishment conditions were 
significantly different for both the Stranger and Partner treatments (on average subjects 
contributed between 2 to 4 times more in Strangers treatment and between 1.5 to 4.3 times more 
in Partners treatment). Average contributions did not decay over time in either treatment with 
punishment, but instead they remained steady for Strangers and increased toward full 
cooperation for Partners (whereas they converged to free-riding with the no-punishment 
condition). For Strangers with punishment, there was no stable behavioral regularity that 
emerged but full free riding was the focal individual action without punishment (Fehr and 
Gaechter, 2000). For Partners, full cooperation and free riding were the behavioral standards for 
the conditions with and without punishment.  Another observation was that the more a subject 
deviated from the average contribution from the other group members, the more the subject was 
punished.  
Overall, there were significant differences between the treatments with and without 
punishment. The possibility of punishment was a credible threat to potential free riders – in the 
punishment condition, very high and even full cooperation can be achieved and maintained; on 
the other hand, in the no-punishment condition, subjects converged towards full free-riding (Fehr 
and Gaechter, 2000). The authors concluded institutional and social structures can have vastly 
different behaviors if there are punishment options. 
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Chaudhuri featured the topic of punishment in his survey of the literature in 2011. 
Different treatments used by authors in experiments with punishment included: costly 
punishment (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000), sanctions – can allocate rewards or punishments (Gurerk 
et al., 2006), duration - 10 rounds compared to 50 rounds (Gaechter et al., 2008), and monitoring 
- the fraction of the group each agent can monitor (Carpenter, 2007). The data throughout the 
experiments mentioned in the survey suggested that providing participants the opportunity to 
engage in punishment helped sustain high levels of contribution but if “anti-social” punishments 
(punishing high contributors for the sake of revenge) were allowed, the net effect is detrimental 
to cooperation. Chaudhuri also studied non-monetary punishments such as expressing 
disapproval and expulsion; he concluded contributions to the public good can be sustained by 
means other than through monetary punishments. 
2.5 Endogenous Contribution Productivity 
 It has not been until recently that public goods games began to incorporate endogenous 
institutions. Isaac and Norton (2010) tested the effects of transparency treatments for retained 
earnings maximizing non-profit organizations (REM). In the sessions, subjects were either 
assigned the role of customer or manager. In this study, it was not the contributors (the 
customers) who chose the MPCR, but it was the manager, who did not make contributions to the 
public good. Customers were unaware of the MPCR when they made their contributions to the 
public good; managers could choose an MPCR of 0.3, which had no cost, or 0.75 which would 
cost 30 tokens to the manager. The managers also had an outside option that enabled him/her to 
receive his/her existing endowment of 50 tokens plus 25 additional tokens and the customers 
would keep their endowment of 50 tokens as well. The first seven sessions were the baseline 
experiments where both treatments were used: customers were given historical information (the 
manager’s choices were revealed every three periods for the previous three periods) and the 
manager had the outside option. Sessions 8-14 were not given the historical information 
treatment but the manager was still offered the outside option. Sessions 15-21 were the opposite, 
the manager did not have the outside option but the customers received historical information. 
The authors found that group enterprises with both the transparency treatments of 
historical information and outside options “supported levels of public goods provision that were 
greater and more stable than in traditional voluntary contribution processes (Isaac and Norton, 
2010).” Transparency matters for REM and other non-profit organizations. Although costly and 
unfamiliar, “they have the potential to support a behavior equilibrium that benefits both the 
organization and its customers (Isaac and Norton, 2010).” 
In 2013, Isaac and Norton (2013) tested “reverse crowding out” which is “the reduction 
of government-provided goods associated with greater private provision to maintain the overall 
level of the public good (Isaac and Norton, 2013).” Isaac and Norton compared the results when 
subjects endogenously chose a tax rate and when there was exogenously determined government 
taxation. It was found that when exogenous taxes were imposed, results were consistent with 
existing field and lab results (incomplete levels of government crowding out of voluntary 
contributions). In regards to endogenous taxation, there was strong evidence that the decay 
flattened and in many cases reversed.  
My experiment has similarities to Smith and Wen’s (2015) experiment regarding 
investing in the MPCR – which reflects investments in technology for producing public goods. 
There are two effects that arise from the additional investment stage to the public goods game: 
1) Incentive effect – subjects have an incentive to contribute because the return on contributions 
is higher. 
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2) Budget effect – subjects have less money to contribute to the public good. 
Subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned to groups of four and given an 
endowment of 10 lab dollars (LD). Subjects each cast a vote on how many LD each subject will 
invest in the productivity of contributions to the public good and the mean of the two middle 
votes was the investment. The second stage of the game was the contribution stage, which is 
similar to a typical public goods game; however, subjects do not have their full endowments to 
contribute after the investment. Subjects repeated this for ten rounds. 
The authors hypothesized that subjects would do well with investment – they will choose 
investment levels close to the optimum and decisions will improve with repetition of the game. 
This first hypothesis was supported by the results; the average investment in the first round was 
4.45 and fell to 3.45 by the final round. This shows that even if it is costly to do so, subjects tend 
toward high productivity when they can choose contribution productivity. 
Hypothesis 2a was that there would be incomplete cooperation in the contribution stage, 
and 2b was that there would be high cooperation. There was more support for hypothesis 2a than 
for 2b. The average contribution percentage began at 0.53 and fell to 0.43, so although 
contributions were short of the social optimum of 100%, they were still above the Nash 
prediction of 0.  
The final hypotheses were regarding the relationship between contributions and 
investments; hypothesis 3a predicted there was a positive relationship and 3b predicted there was 
a negative relationship. These results depended on which of the two effects (incentive or budget) 
was dominant. According to the regressions for absolute contribution amounts, the authors failed 
to provide significant evidence for either hypothesis. Neither of the two effects was significant 
and it was concluded that the incentive and budget effects offset each other. However, for 
contribution percentages, it was found that percentages were positively related to investment. 
Thus, there was a significant incentive effect of contribution productivity.  
Overall, the authors concluded that although subjects did well with investments, the 
primary source of loss relative to the social optimum was their contribution behavior.  
It is important to note that the difference between this experiment and my own is that 
there is no dynamic link. These subjects’ investments do not carry over from round to round; in 
every round, their MPCRs restart at 0.30 before the investment stage. However, in my 
experiment, the MPCR builds throughout the ten periods of decision making. 
  
2.6 Macroeconomics and Dynamic Links between Periods 
2.6.1 Macroeconomic Experiments 
Traditionally, macroeconomic theories were not tested in laboratory environments 
because it was argued that macroeconomics is a purely observational science and its questions 
cannot be addressed with experimental methods. However, Duffy (2016) argues using laboratory 
methods sheds light on important questions regarding the “empirical relevance of 
microeconomic foundations, questions of causal inference, equilibrium selection and the role of 
institutions.” So far, the main insights resulting from macroeconomic experiments are: an 
assessment of micro-assumptions underlying macroeconomic models, an understanding of the 
dynamics of forward-looking expectations, means of resolving coordination problems, validation 
of macroeconomic model predictions, and the impact of macroeconomic institutions and policy 
interventions. 
An example of a macroeconomic study was by Vivian Lei and Charles N. Noussair 
(2002) who studied the basic ideas of growth theory. They test the prediction of whether or not 
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an economy of human decision makers will converge to the optimal steady state level. They used 
two different levels of endowment – high (the endowment is greater than the optimal steady 
state) and low (less than the optimal steady state).  It was predicted that consumption and capital 
stock will converge to the optimal steady state from above for High Endowment and from below 
for Low Endowment.  
A treatment used was the Social Planner treatment; individual subjects were given the 
role of “social planner” and a monetary incentive to maximize the discounted sum of the utility 
for the economy. This treatment was to correspond closely to the theoretical model. Another 
treatment used was the Market treatment which included two features: the economy was 
populated with multiple (five) heterogeneous agents. A market for capital was present with a 
structure believed to enhance the efficient allocation of resources between investment and 
consumption. There was a double auction in this market treatment; the market communicated the 
market price of the outputs to the five subjects. In the Market treatment, the experimenters were 
studying if the economy would converge to the optimal steady state with a decentralized 
structure. In the social planner treatment, there was not a market for output.  
Lei and Noussair found that there was a strong tendency for consumption to converge 
towards the unique steady state values. In the Social Planner treatment, consumption was 
generally lower than the steady state level, making it much more volatile. On the other hand, 
strong convergence was found in the market treatment. 
2.6.2 Public Goods Experiments with Dynamic Links 
There are very few public good experiments that incorporate dynamic links between 
rounds. One of the few experiments is Battaglini et al. (2012). The authors study the dynamic 
free rider phenomenon in a durable public good. They consider two cases – economies with 
reversibility (RIE) and economies with irreversibility (IIE). A public good is reversible if players 
can either increase it or decrease it which would transform it back to private consumption; 
players cannot decrease public goods if they are irreversible (Battaglini et al., 2012). The main 
two treatments are reversibility (levels of individual investment can be negative) vs 
irreversibility (individual investments cannot be negative) and the secondary treatments are the 
number of subjects per game, n=3 vs. n=5. The prediction is that there should be greater 
contributions and a higher equilibrium steady state level in IIE than in RIE and that there is no 
significant difference as a function of n.  
It was found that irreversible investment led to higher public good production than in 
reversible investments. The average stock of the public good was significantly lower (at the 1% 
level) in RIE in every single period for both group sizes; the differences were not only 
statistically significant, but the median stock in the IIE treatment was around six times greater 
than in RIE (Battaglini et al., 2012). Another finding was that both RIE and IIE investments lead 
to significantly inefficient long-run public good levels. The median stock in periods 7-10 
averaged 13 in RIE and 280.5 in IIE; the average stock in the last periods were significantly 
smaller than the level predicted by the optimal solution.  
The three main results the authors found were that free riding exists in dynamic 
situations; long run public good stock levels fell short of efficiency in all treatments (this was 
seen mostly in RIE). The second main result was the over-investment in early periods and 
gradual decline towards the equilibrium steady state. Finally, that there is evidence of 
Markovian, forward-looking behavior.  
Another experiment using dynamic interdependencies on subjects’ contributions was 
conducted by Gaechter et al. (2014).  The subjects’ income at the end of each period became 
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their endowments in the next period; this setting creates the possibility of growth (if 
contributions are high then wealth will increase in the next period) and inequality of wealth 
(heterogeneity in contributions create inequality in the next period’s endowments).  
With these two key aspects of dynamic interdependencies, questions arise regarding 
punishment – the authors study if punishment stabilizes contributions by applying two 
treatments, the “NOPUNISH” treatment and the “PUNISH” treatment. Both treatments use 
groups of 4 randomly matched subjects that start with an endowment of 20 tokens. Similar to a 
standard public goods game, subjects allocate their tokens between a private and group account. 
However, the amount of tokens that can be invested in period t+1 depends on the choices of all 
group members in period t. In the PUNISH treatment, there is a second stage; subjects can 
subtract tokens from other members of the group at a cost (1/3 of the tokens subtracted).  Other 
treatments used were “NOPUNISH-NOGROWTH and PUNISH-NOGROWTH” and 
“NOPUNISHNOINEQUALITY and PUNISH-NOINEQUALITY” where experimenters 
artificially eliminate growth and inequality. A final variation treatment was the number of 
repetitions; four sessions had 15 periods and six had 10 periods.  
The results found were the following: 
1. Contributions were positive and did not decay in either treatment. Without punishment, 
participants contributed about 50% of their 20 tokens in the first period and their 
contributions steadily increased. With punishment, no significant difference in average 
contributions were found, but contributions in PUNISH were higher compared to 
NOPUNISH in later periods. 
2. Growth and inequality are higher without punishment. Both the average and median group 
income were higher without punishment; this supports that dynamic interdependencies are 
more effective than punishment. The mean group income without punishment was 239.92 
and 166.11 with punishment; median without punishment was 184 and 80 with punishment. 
There was no significant difference in average between poor groups between treatments and 
no significant difference between treatments in the rich groups. 
3. Group income and Gini coefficient were positively correlated for poor groups but negatively 
correlated for rich groups. 
4. There was large path dependence, the initial group income was strongly positively correlated 
with the eventual group income and initial inequality was highly detrimental to the final 
group income. 
5. Possibility of exponential growth was crucial to sustain the increasing contributions 
throughout the experiment. 
6. Without endogenous inequality, there were higher contributions. 
7. Subjects did not react strongly between the different time horizons of 10 periods and 15 
periods. 
2.7 Summary 
 The literature of public goods experiments has greatly expanded since the development of 
the theory in the 1950s. Numerous economists have conducted variations on standard public 
goods experiments to attempt to understand why subjects do not typically follow the dominant 
strategy and free-ride.  Although the literature is broad, there have not been many experiments 
involving endogenous productivity nor dynamic links between rounds. My experiment 
incorporates both by allowing subjects to vote on building their MPCR which carries from round 
to round. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
This chapter describes the design of the experiment including the procedures followed, 
applications used, and information subjects received prior to the start of the session. All 
experiments took place in the Department of Social Science and Policy Studies’ Experimental 
Economics Lab (Room 223A of Salisbury Labs at WPI) at varying times throughout a span of 
four months. 
3.1 Subject Recruitment 
During the beginning weeks of WPI’s undergraduate introductory economics courses, 
students were informed of the opportunity to participate in an economics experiment to receive 
extra credit towards their final grade. Interested students were entered into a mailing alias to be 
notified of upcoming scheduled experiments and were able to register through WPI’s Regi 25 
system. Regi 25 is a website used to register for events sponsored by different departments on 
campus; it is maintained by the school’s Computing and Communications Center (Wen, 2014).  
3.2 Logistics 
Eight subjects participated in each session, but ten students were invited to attend as a 
precautionary measure in case some students did not show up or were late. If the session was full 
and extra students arrived on time, they were paid a show up fee of ten dollars and also given the 
extra credit for their course, but they also had the choice to remain on the mailing alias if they 
were still interested in participating in a future session.  
Prior to the decision making, two copies of an informed consent agreement form were 
distributed to each subject. The form covered topics such as the purpose of the study, procedures 
to be followed, possible foreseeable risks or discomforts resulting from participation, payment, 
and the experimenters’ contact information; these forms had been approved by WPI’s 
Institutional Review Board (WPI IRB #15-156) prior to the start of the research. In order to 
begin, subjects must agree to what was outlined in the forms by providing their signatures; 
however, participation in the research was voluntary and refusal to participate did not result in 
any penalty or loss of entitled benefits. One of the two signed copies from each subject was 
collected by the experimenter and the other copies were kept by the students for their own 
records. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Unlike the original public goods experiments that were run in the 1980s, the sessions were 
conducted in a lab setting instead of via telephone and mail. Therefore, each session lasted 
approximately sixty minutes opposed to several weeks. 
Subjects were seated at private computer work stations and entered their decisions 
through the z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) application. Thus, interaction between subjects was 
limited. They did not communicate face-to-face or discuss at any point during the session; all 
interaction between the subjects occurred over the computer network via feedback from their 
voting and contribution decisions.  
3.3 The Experiment 
Everyone obtained a copy of the instructions (see Appendix A) which were read aloud to 
the subjects and there were opportunities for questions and answers.  
The eight subjects were randomly assigned into two groups of four and the identity of 
one’s group members remained anonymous for the duration of the experiment. The group size of 
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four used in this experiment was to be consistent with the public goods literature, in which four 
is the most common group size. 
Each session consisted of two tasks; each task was a series of ten rounds of decision 
making. In addition, each round had two stages: an investment stage and a contribution stage 
(which proceeded as a normal public goods game with starting amounts of money equal to what 
was left after the investment). At the start of every round, all subjects received an endowment of 
ten lab dollars (LD; 1 LD=0.1 US).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is the first known experiment that incorporates 
endogenous determination of contribution productivity and dynamic links between rounds. These 
two aspects are incorporated through the investment stage of each round where subjects had the 
opportunity to increase their MPCR from the starting value of 0.30 (this initial MPCR is the 
“low” MPCR used by Isaac and Walker, 1988). First, they voted over how many lab dollars each 
person in the group would invest in increasing the MPCR by submitting a whole number 
between zero and ten, inclusive. The median voter rule was applied and the group’s investment 
was the average of the two middle votes. Then, MPCR increased by 0.01 multiplied by the 
investment. For example, in the first round where MPCR equaled 0.30, if subjects voted 1, 3, 5, 
and 6, the investment would be 4. Therefore, all four group members invested 4 and had a 
remaining amount of 6 LD left after the investment. MPCR would then equal 0.34. Subjects 
voted on an investment and invested in their MPCR every round, and the amount carried on 
throughout the ten rounds of the task. 
Mt = Mt-1 + 0.01(It) for t = 1, 2,…, 10 
M0 = 0.30  
In the instructions, the incentives to invest in the MPCR were noted to the subjects. The 
early (late) rounds, the incentive to invest in increasing the MPCR was high (low) because there 
were more (fewer) future rounds to benefit from having a higher MPCR. Having a higher MPCR 
provided a higher incentive to contribute in the second stage of each round because the benefit of 
contributing was higher. 
Following the investment stage was the contribution stage where subjects decided how to 
allocate their remaining lab dollars between a private account and a group account, similar to a 
typical public goods game. If the investment had been 10, then subjects simply contributed zero 
to the group account because they had no money left at the start of the contribution stage. In each 
round, the sum of the group members’ contributions were multiplied by the new MPCR and this 
amount, in addition to any lab dollars the subject had remaining after the investment and 
contribution stage was the subject’s payoff for that round (note that every subject benefited from 
the sum of the group contributions multiplied by the MPCR regardless of whether or not they 
contributed). Thus, each subject’s payoff for each round was:  
πit = 10 – It – cit + Mt ∑ cjt 
where: 
πi = the individual’s payoff 
I = the investment 
ci = the individual’s contribution to the group account 
M = MPCR 
cj = the other members’ contributions to the group account 
t = the round of the task. 
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 It was also noted to the subjects that having a high MPCR alone was not enough to 
increase the payoffs. Having a high MPCR was only helpful if people subsequently contributed 
significant amounts. 
After the first task (the first ten rounds of decision making), students were given 
instructions to the second task which was another series of ten rounds of decision making. The 
MPCR restarted back to 0.30. A treatment implemented in these tasks was Strangers vs. Partners; 
half of the sessions had fixed groups in both tasks and the other half had their group members 
rematched in the second task (group members did not change each round of task two, but were 
simply rematched once from the first task).  
Upon the completion of the experiment, subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire 
which asked for demographics and contact information. Then, the students signed receipt forms 
and were given their payments in a private manner. Their total earnings were the sum of their 
earnings from task one and two. 
 
3.4 Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum 
 Similar to most public goods games, the Nash equilibrium of this version is to invest and 
contribute zero. This can be found through backward induction by looking at the contribution 
stage in round ten. This is the final round (that subjects are aware of), thus subjects should play 
the dominant strategy in a single-shot game and contribute nothing to the group account; this is 
assuming all the subjects are rational and self-interested (Wen, 2014). Also, subjects should not 
invest in round ten because since it is the final round, there are no future rounds where they 
would benefit from building their MPCR. Because there is neither contribution nor investment in 
the final round, by using backward induction the same should happen in round 9, 8, 7, and so on 
(Wen, 2014). Thus, with no investment or contribution, subjects simply keep their endowments, 
earn 10 LD per round, and have a total payoff of 100 lab dollars. 
To understand the social optimum, consider that because subjects receive an endowment 
of 10 LD each round, they receive a total of 100 LD throughout the ten rounds. The subjects 
must decide how to allocate those 100 LD to attain the maximum payoff, and we assume that all 
of the endowment is either invested or contributed. The graph below displays the total profits for 
the subjects corresponding to how many LDs they invest and contribute throughout the ten 
rounds, and it can be seen that the maximum average profit is 169 LD, which results from a total 
investment of 35 LD (which builds the MPCR to 0.65) and a total contribution of 65 LD. It must 
be noted that this maximum average profit is when there is symmetry among all subjects’ 
investment and contribution decisions. 
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Figure 3.1: Total profit with full cooperation. 
Next, we can look at the rounds individually with each endowment of 10 LD, instead of 
the total of 100 LD. It would mean that for subjects to reach social optimum, they would have to 
invest fully during the first three rounds, invest half their endowments in the fourth round, and 
contribute everything else to the group account. This achieves the total investment of 35 LD and 
the total contribution of 65 LD. This can be seen via the graph below: 
 
Figure 3.2: Investments and contributions for social optimum. 
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By following this strategy, the group will maximize its overall payoff. The graphs below 
reflect the payoffs and the cumulative earnings when subjects follow the social optimum 
compared to payoffs when they play Nash.   
 
Figure 3.3: Payoffs using Nash strategy and social optimum behavior. 
 
Figure 3.4: Cumulative earnings for Nash strategy and social optimum behavior. 
It can be seen that although theory predicts subjects should follow Nash, following the 
social optimum results in higher earnings in the long run. 
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3.4.1 Free-Riding while Others Cooperate 
It has been explained in the previous chapter that the public goods problem is that 
individual self-interest is at odds with group interest (Ledyard, 1995), thus some people decide to 
free-ride and some people decide to cooperate. The following graph demonstrates what occurs if 
one member of a group free-rides fully throughout the session while the others fully cooperate 
(but since everyone invests the same amount in this experiment, we are only considering free-
riding on contributions). It can be seen that the maximum total profits vary by 73.33 for one task, 
which translates to a $14.66 difference across the two tasks (since 1 LD = 0.1 USD). However, 
this example assumes only one subject free-rides while the others fully cooperate.  
 
Figure 3.5: The socially optimal total profit versus the total profits if there was one free-rider and three full contributors. 
The graph below demonstrates what happens if more than one subject free-rides. As the 
number of free-riders increases, each subject’s total profit decreases. And if all subject’s free 
ride, all total profits will be 100 LD (as in section 3.4.1). 
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Figure 3.6: The total profits for one free rider and three full contributors, two free riders and two full contributors, and three 
free riders and one full contributor. 
Although these scenarios are unlikely because subjects would not continue to fully 
contribute if they notice not everyone is reciprocating the contributions, they illustrate the 
incentive to free-ride because of the potential difference in payoffs. It is clear that free-riding 
while others contribute result in higher payoffs for the individual. This exemplifies how self-
interest is at odds with group interest. 
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
In this section, I provide my hypotheses for the investment stage and the contribution 
stage of my public goods game. 
3.5.1 Investment Stage 
 In this stage, subjects are not able to free-ride; all members of a group contribute the 
same investment that was determined from the voting process and the application of the median 
voter rule. Because not every individual’s votes influences the amount invested (only the two 
middle votes determine the investment), it is difficult for subjects to easily determine the optimal 
amount to invest/vote across the ten rounds. However, since the incentives to invest are 
described in the instructions (see Appendix A) and it is specified that the incentive to invest in 
early (late) rounds is high (low) because there are more (fewer) future rounds to benefit from 
having a high MPCR, I propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Votes and investments will start high but will decay towards zero by the final 
round of the task due to the incentives to invest. 
 
As mentioned, subjects cannot easily calculate the social optimum investment but 
throughout the rounds, subjects can clearly see the difference in benefits with a low MPCR and a 
high MPCR. I propose that subjects will want to get their MPCR to be as high as possible and in 
result continue to vote in late rounds and invest more than necessary. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects will overshoot and continue to vote and invest even after reaching the 
social optimum. 
3.5.2 Contribution Stage 
 The second half of each round is similar to a standard public goods game, the only 
difference is the amount subjects have to contribute, which is the remainder after the investment 
– not the full endowment. However, subjects are still contributing between a private account and 
a group account. As seen from the public goods literature, the strong-free riding hypothesis is 
rarely supported and subjects tend to contribute between 40% and 60% of the group optimum 
(Ledyard, 1995). Thus, my hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The subjects will demonstrate weak-free riding; contributions will be greater than 
zero but below the group optimum. 
 
With hypothesis 1, it is expected that investments will decay by the final rounds, thus 
subjects will have higher remaining amounts to contribute in later rounds. And because it is 
hypothesized subjects will build up high MPCRs (Hypothesis 2), and the higher the MPCR the 
higher the contribution (Hypothesis 3), this leads to my next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Subjects’ contributions will increase over time as subjects invest less and 
contribute more. 
3.5.3 MPCR 
An important finding from the public goods literature is that higher MPCRs tend to lead 
to greater efficiency in public goods provision (i.e., higher MPCRS incentivize contributions) 
and lower MPCRs lead to significantly increased free riding behavior (Isaac and Walker, 1988). 
It is noted to the subjects in the instructions that a higher MPCR does not increase payoffs on its 
own, but is only helpful if people subsequently contribute significant amounts. Because subjects 
do not communicate with one another directly during the experiment, although communication 
has been found to significantly improve cooperation (Isaac and Walker, 1988), the subjects can 
use the investment stage to inexplicitly indicate their willingness to cooperate during the 
upcoming contribution stage. Findings from public goods literature and the inexplicit indication 
among the subjects leads to my next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the MPCR, the higher the percentage of the remaining endowment 
contributed will be – and vice versa. 
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3.5.4 Payoffs  
Section 3.3 explains that each subject’s payoff for each round depends on the MPCR and 
the sum of all the group members’ contributions. It is noted in the instructions that the benefit of 
contributing is higher with a high MPCR, and this is reflected in the payoffs. Because it is 
hypothesized that contributions will increase over time, and that subjects will build their MPCRs, 
my next hypothesis is the following:  
Hypothesis 6: Payoffs will increase over time because of the high MPCRs and the subsequent 
contributions in later rounds. 
3.5.5 Sequence 1 vs. Sequence 2 
By sequence 2, subjects will have had ten rounds of experience in this public goods 
game. They will have seen for themselves that building their MPCRs directly benefit them. 
Subjects will have learned the incentives of building their MPCRs and subsequently 
contributing. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 7: Subjects will do better in sequence 2 than in sequence 1 due to learning. 
Specifically, their voting/investing behavior will be closer to the social optimum (a greater rate 
of investment in early rounds and then a steeper decline in later rounds) and contributions and 
payoffs will be higher (greater rates of contributions and payoffs in later rounds after having 
built their MPCRs). 
3.5.6 Partners vs. Strangers 
It was predicted that if a subject was in an uncooperative group, the subject would be 
more likely to free-ride in the next sequence. Therefore, seven of the sessions were rematched in 
the second sequence to test for the effects of the Partners vs. Strangers treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Subjects that are in rematched (Strangers) sessions will do better in the second 
sequence (i.e., higher investments, contributions, and payoffs) compared to fixed groups 
(Partners). 
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Chapter IV: Results 
4.1 Review 
There were a total of fourteen sessions conducted with eight subjects each, thus, there 
was a total of 114 subjects. In each session, the subjects were randomly divided into two groups 
of four. Recall that there were two sequences of ten rounds. Therefore, there were 2240 
individual observations (vote, contribution, and profit) and 560 group observations (investment). 
Only the final M and Total Profits (a group observation and individual observation) from round 
ten is presented below. In addition, there were 2136 contribution percentage observations 
because the 104 instances where subjects were unable to contribute were eliminated. Presented 
below are summary statistics from the sessions. 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
Vote 0 10 4.766 5 3.607 2240 
Investment 0 10 4.727 5 2.960 560 
M (round 10) 0.47 0.945 0.627 0.650 0.151 224 
Contribution 0 10 2.980 2 2.811 2240 
Contribution 
Percentage 
0 100 57.225 60 37.019 2136 
Profit 0 36.158 10.455 8.415 7.752 2240 
Total Profit 
(round 10) 
59.224 159.225 40.357 30.078 35.439 224 
4.2 Votes and Investment 
I hypothesized that votes and investment will start off high and decay to zero (Hypothesis 
1). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the trend lines for the two variables. 
 
Figure 4.7: Average vote per round. 
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Figure 4.8: Average investment per round. 
The graphs support Hypothesis 1 because there is a clear negative slope for both 
variables; the average vote for round one if we pool the four values (between the two sequences 
and treatments) is 7.11 and the average vote for round ten is 1.29. This is similar for investment 
where the average investment in round one is 7.35 and 0.73 for round ten. This indicates that the 
subjects understand the incentives to invest early on and then contribute in later rounds to benefit 
from a high MPCR. Figure 4.3 shows how high the subjects were able to build their MPCRs. 
 
Figure 4.9: Average MPCR per round. 
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reached by round six for both sequence ones and round five in both sequence twos, but subjects 
continued to build their MPCR up to as high as 0.945. 
 If we look at the four lines, we can see that both the average votes and investment are 
higher in round one of sequence two for both fixed and rematch sessions. Similarly, the average 
votes and investment are lower in round ten for sequence two for both fixed and rematch 
sessions. In addition, the negative slope is steeper in sequence two for both variables; subjects 
are investing more to build their MPCRs early on and then lessening their investments in later 
rounds to benefit from those investments. This reflects the learning that happens between the two 
sequences and supports Hypothesis 7 that there is a greater rate of investment in early rounds and 
a steeper decline in later rounds. 
Following is the regression of votes to examine the statistical significance of the trend. 
 
According to this regression, on average, the starting average vote is 7.33 (we must 
subtract the round coefficient of 0.55 from 7.88 because the constant reflects “round 0” not 
round 1 where the experiment begins) and decreases by approximately 0.55 for every round in 
sequence one. For sequence two, on average, the starting average vote is 8.48 (7.88 + 1.45 - 0.55 
- 0.30) and decreases by approximately 0.85 (-0.55 + -0.30) for every round. This shows that in 
sequence two, the average vote starts off higher and the rate of change from round to round is 
steeper. It can be seen by the regression that this negative slope from early rounds to later rounds 
is statistically significant since the p-value for round is less than 0.000 which further supports 
Hypothesis 1. 
Following is the regression for average investment per round. 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
According to this regression, on average, the starting average investment is 7.62 in 
sequence one and this value decreases by 0.63 for every round. For sequence two, on average, 
the starting average investment is 9.13; for every round, the average investment decreases by 
0.99. The finding from this regression is similar to that of average votes – the negative slope of 
investment from round to round is statistically significant. The statistical significance of these 
negative slopes for vote and investment from these two regressions provide support for 
Hypothesis 1. 
4.3 Contributions 
 In public goods experiments, the classic theory is that subjects will follow the dominant 
strategy and contribute zero to free ride. However, the literature has shown that weak free riding 
is much more common than strong free riding – in other words, subjects typically contribute 
some amount (but not the social optimum), as opposed to contributing nothing. The contribution 
percentage typically observed in public goods experiments is between 40 to 60 percent of group 
optimum (Ledyard, 1995). Our observations regarding contributions are similar to those found in 
the literature. 
Hypothesis 3 is that subjects will demonstrate weak free-riding – contributions that are 
above zero but below the group optimum. The other hypothesis regarding contributions is 
Hypothesis 4; subjects’ contributions will increase over time. Figure 4.4 represents the average 
amount of lab dollars remaining after investment and Figure 4.5 represents the average amount 
from those remaining lab dollars contributed every round. 
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Figure 10.4: Average remainder per round. 
 
Figure 4.11: Average contribution per round. 
It can be seen that the average contribution is always above zero which provides support 
for Hypothesis 3. The contributions were expected to start off low because subjects should be 
investing high amounts at first – which can be seen in Figure 4.2 – and then increase later on 
when subjects have more to contribute due to smaller investments. From the trend lines, it can 
also be seen that subjects’ contributions are almost always increasing (the only exception is the 
final round in Sequence 2 – Rematch) which supports Hypothesis 4.  
Following is the regression for contributions. 
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According to this regression, on average, the starting average contribution is 0.56 in 
sequence one and this value increases by 0.39 for every round. For sequence two, on average, the 
starting average contribution is 0.39; for every round, the average contribution increases by 0.55. 
The findings from this regression are statistically significant, indicating that on average, there is 
growth from round to round for both sequences; this supports Hypothesis 4 that contributions 
increase over time.  
The following regression shows the relationship between contribution and round, 
sequence, and MPCR. 
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 This regression shows us that there is initially a negative relationship between MPCR and 
contribution (not statistically significant), but for every round in sequence one, contribution 
increases by 0.45 and by 0.60 in sequence two (statistically significant). 
Hypothesis 5 was that there is a direct relationship between MPCR and contribution 
percentage, but before we look at the percentages, we look at the relationship between MPCR 
and absolute contributions. From the regression below, we see that on average, for every increase 
in M (by 1.0), contribution increases by 8.56. The coefficient for MPCR is statistically 
significant which supports that a relationship exists between the two variables, and because we 
have seen that contributions increase and that the coefficient for M is positive, this supports that 
there is a direct relationship between MPCR and contributions – the two variables increase 
together. 
 
In order to compare the differences between sequences, I run three regressions: one for 
rounds 1-3, another for rounds 4-7, and one for rounds 8-10. This is because it is hypothesized 
that contributions will be higher in sequence two than in sequence one, but because it is also 
expected that subjects do better with investing in sequence two, subjects should not have many 
lab dollars to contribute in early rounds (i.e., we would not see higher contributions until later 
rounds). Thus, we break the rounds into different groups to avoid grouping together rounds 
where subjects are unable to contribute high amounts with those where they are able. 
First, we look at rounds 1-3. 
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 We see that in the first three rounds, there is a negative relationship between the MPCR 
and contribution. As MPCR increases by 1.0, contribution decreases by 1.30. This finding makes 
sense because in the early rounds, subjects should be investing their endowments – not 
contributing. Because they are building their MPCRs, they do not have money to contribute to 
the public good – which explains the negative relationship between the two variables. The 
coefficient for the MPCR is 0.01 away from being statistically significant at the 95% level; 
however it is still significant at the 90% level. 
Next, we look at rounds 4-7. 
 
 The variables now have a positive relationship. For every increase in M (by 1.0), 
contribution increases by 6.84. This finding makes sense because for the groups to reach social 
optimum, subjects should have fully invested in rounds 1-3, invested half and then contributed 
half in round 4, and then fully contributed in the remaining rounds. On average, by round four, 
subjects have built their MPCRs up to 0.58 and although they did not reach social optimum, they 
began to contribute to benefit from their investment. The coefficient for the MPCR in these 
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rounds is statistically significant, showing support that the higher the MPCR, the higher the 
contributions. 
Finally, we look at rounds 8-10. 
 
 With this final regression for rounds 8-10, we see that there is, once again, a positive 
relationship between MPCR and contribution. For every 1.0 increase in MPCR, contribution 
increases by 6.79. This relationship is statistically significant at the 99% level. 
As mentioned before, it was expected that the higher the MPCR, the higher the 
percentage of the remaining endowment contributed (Hypothesis 5). Because the MPCR was 
always increasing, which can be seen in Figure 4.3, it was expected for the contribution 
percentage to always be increasing as well.  This was also expected because since subjects 
invested and built their MPCRs, it was a sign that they would be willing to cooperate and 
therefore would subsequently contribute significant amounts. Figure 4.6 illustrates the average 
contribution percentages per round.  
 
Figure 4.12: Average contribution percentage per round. 
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The trend lines in this graph do not support Hypothesis 5, because although the MPCR is 
increasing, it can be seen there are various points where subjects’ average contribution 
percentage decreases. These trend lines also contradict Hypothesis 7 (contribution would be 
better in sequence two than in sequence one) because the average contribution percentages in 
sequence two are generally lower than those of sequence one. It should be noted that in order to 
calculate the average percentages for these lines, only contributions where subjects had 
remaining amounts to contribute are included (i.e., if the remaining amount left after investment 
was zero, those observations were discarded in order to avoid dividing by zero). This could have 
impacted our results because those who invested fully were probably those more willing to 
cooperate.  
 
This regression of contribution percentages also does not support my hypotheses because none of 
the p-values are statistically significant.  
 
 
 
38 
 
 The above regression includes MPCR, and once again, none of the p-values are 
statistically significant. However, this regression does indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between MPCR and contribution percentage; for every 1.0 increase in MPCR, there is a 0.537 
increase in contribution percentage. This is only significant at the 85% confidence level. 
4.4 Profits and Total Profits 
Hypothesis 6 was that profits will increase over time because of the high MPCRS and 
subsequent contributions. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 represent the average profit and average total profit 
per round. 
 
Figure 4.13: Average profit per round. 
 
Figure 4.14: Average total profit per round. 
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 Almost all these trend lines support Hypothesis 6 except for the average profit for 
Sequence 2 – Rematch in the last round. However, in all other rounds and for the rest of the trend 
lines, the average profit and average total profit is always increasing. It can be seen in Figure 4.8 
that for both fixed and rematch, the total profits are higher in sequence two than in sequence one, 
which supports Hypothesis 7.   
Following is the regression for average profits. 
 
 This regression indicates that initially, there is a negative relationship between MPCR 
and average profit. The coefficient for round is statistically significant for both sequence one and 
two; in sequence one, for each round, the average profit increases by almost 2.00 and for 
sequence two, the average profit increases by 2.52. This is in support of both Hypothesis 6 and 7 
that profits will be increasing and will be higher in sequence two than in sequence one. 
 Similar to contribution, I will run three regressions on average profit per round to see the 
relationship between MPCR and profit for rounds 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10. 
First is the regression for rounds 1-3. 
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Next, we look at rounds 4-7. 
 
Finally, we look at rounds 8-10. 
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 These findings are similar to those for contribution. In rounds 1-3, there is a negative 
relationship between MPCR and profit but there is a positive relationship in the two other 
groups. All the coefficients for MPCR in these three regressions are statistically significant, 
indicating that subjects understand the incentives to build their MPCR in order to gain high 
profits. In particular, this supports Hypothesis 6 because the coefficient is increasing between the 
three groups, showing that the rate of change in profit is increasing as the MPCR increases. 
In the regression for total profits, we only look at the total profits for round ten because 
profits in early rounds do not exemplify how well subjects are doing (i.e., profits can be lower in 
earlier rounds because subjects are building their MPCRs). 
 
 Although, on average, the average total profit in round ten is higher in sequence two than 
sequence one, it is not statistically significant at the 95% level – although it is significant at the 
90% level. 
4.5 Strangers vs. Partners 
One of the treatments used in this experiment is strangers vs. partners; half of the sessions 
had their groups rematched in sequence two and the other half remained fixed. Hypothesis 8 was 
regarding whether or not rematching affected the subjects’ behavior; it was hypothesized that 
rematched groups would do better than fixed groups.  The reasoning for applying this treatment 
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was because if subjects are in an uncooperative group in sequence one, this would negatively 
affect their behavior in sequence two. Applying strangers vs. partners can eliminate this 
influence from the bad experience in sequence one since subjects do not know their new 
members in sequence two. One way to see the effect of this treatment is to view the regressions 
of the subjects’ average total profit (in round ten) with “rematch” as the independent variable (a 
dummy variable was used to indicate whether a group was fixed or rematched).  
 
 This regression shows a positive coefficient for rematch, indicating a positive relationship 
between average total profit and rematch. However, the p-value of 0.984 shows the relationship 
is not statistically significant; thus, rematching groups does not have a significant effect on 
subjects’ average total profits in this version of the public goods experiment. 
Another way to observe the stranger vs. partner’s treatment effect is by viewing how each 
session’s average total profit changed from sequence one to sequence two. The first graph 
represents all sessions and the following two shows fixed and rematched sessions. 
 
Figure 15: Average total profit for all sessions. 
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Figure 4.10: Average total profit for fixed sessions. 
 
Figure 4.11: Average total profit for rematched sessions. 
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two. 
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4.6 Summary 
 We found support for six of our hypotheses. There was support for Hypothesis 1 – votes 
and investments started off high but decayed towards zero by the final round because subjects 
understood the incentive to invest high amounts in early rounds and then subsequently 
contributed in later rounds to benefit from their high MPCRs. Support was also found for 
Hypothesis 2; there were 56 group observations for final MPCRs in round ten and 51 of those 
observations had an MPCR higher than 0.65. Hypotheses 3 and 4 regarding contributions were 
also supported – average contribution was always above zero and the regressions showed that 
contributions were increasing in later rounds. It should also be noted that in this experiment, the 
observation that contributions increased through time is rare because in public goods 
experiments subjects typically become more self-interested with repetition – not more 
cooperative. Hypothesis 5 was not supported but this could be due to the fact that observations 
where subjects fully invested and did not have money left to contribute were discarded and those 
subjects were probably the ones more willing to cooperate. Hypothesis 6 was also supported and 
the regressions showed the relationship between profit and MPCR was statistically significant in 
all three groups. Hypothesis 7 was also supported because it was found that subjects were more 
cooperative which resulted in more productivity in the public good. Finally, there was not 
support for Hypothesis 8; the regressions did not show the treatment effect to be statistically 
significant but the spreads of the final average total profit indicate there is a negative effect if 
subjects are in an uncooperative group in sequence one which was the reason the treatment was 
originally implemented. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
As previously discussed in Chapter II, the free-rider hypothesis – that all rational people 
will follow the Nash Equilibrium and contribute zero to the group account – is one of the most 
widely accepted propositions in the public goods literature (Marwell and Ames, 1981). If a 
subject free-rides, he or she can still benefit from the public good while keeping his or her own 
endowment, thus, self-interest is at odds with group interest (Ledyard, 1995). It is common in the 
literature to see subjects’ contributions decay from 40 to 60 percent contribution towards zero 
percent contribution by the final rounds as the subjects learn the dominant strategy. 
My version of the public goods game is different from those in the literature; it is the first 
dynamic public goods game with endogenous contribution productivity. Subjects determine 
contribution productivity by voting over how much to invest in increasing contribution 
productivity in the first stage of each round, and then everyone in the group invests the same 
amount (the amount is determined by using the median voter rule); therefore, it is impossible to 
free-ride during the investment stage. The MPCRs that the subjects build are dynamic; in other 
words, they carry from round to round.  The incentives to invest in the MPCR and contribute to 
the public good were noted to the subjects in the instructions (see Appendix A). For example, it 
was noted that a high MPCR is only helpful if the subjects subsequently contributed, and the 
benefit of contributing to the public good is higher with a higher MPCR. Therefore, there are 
greater incentives to be cooperative in my version of the public goods game than in those in the 
literature where the MPCR is exogenously determined by the experimenter or by an exogenously 
determined government (Isaac and Norton, 2013).  
A major finding from my experiment is that subjects generally did better in sequence two 
than in sequence one (e.g., more cooperative and closer to the social optimum), indicating that 
there was a learning effect between sequences. Specifically, subjects were investing more in 
earlier rounds (i.e., the rate at which they were building their MPCRs was greater). In sequence 
two, the subjects’ MPCRs were closer to the social optimum than in sequence one (i.e., they did 
not overshoot as much). Also, subjects’ contributions increased over time. These are rare 
observations in public goods literature because subjects typically free ride more with repetition – 
not become more cooperative. 
5.2 Recommendations 
From my findings, I propose a few recommendations for real world policies.  
First, my findings support Xi Wen’s recommendation from 2014: 
1) Let people choose the productivity of their public goods (Wen, 2014).  
It was found in both our projects that by allowing subjects to endogenously determine their 
contribution productivity by engaging in investment, the decline in profits were alleviated. 
Instead of contributions decaying toward zero, it was observed that absolute contributions 
increased with repetition; therefore, total profits increased throughout the experiment. In regards 
to voting, there were 373 observations where a subject voted to invest their full endowment. 
Through voting, we can potentially see subjects’ willingness to cooperate, and this observation 
shows that many of the subjects were willing to contribute to the provision of the public good, 
even though it was a costly investment. It is also possible that subjects vote higher to force a 
higher investment upon their group members (i.e., with higher votes, the median is higher which 
makes the investment higher; the other group members might be more likely to contribute with a 
high investment while one can take advantage of the high MPCR and free-ride). I recommend 
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that people are given more of a choice for determining investments in public goods. Examples of 
endogenous decision making would be the government consulting with their constituents via 
forums, town meetings, councils, surveys, etc. Our results indicate that having the ability to 
invest increases public good productivity. Investing in an institution or public good agency could 
allow for more research or more policies to benefit the public. 
2) Educate people on the incentives to invest and contribute to public goods. 
The subjects of my experiment were told the following: 
1. In the early (late) rounds, the incentive to invest in increasing M is high (low) because there 
are more (fewer) future rounds during which you can benefit from having a higher M. 
2. A higher M does not on its own increase your payoff. A higher M is helpful only if people 
subsequently contribute significant amounts. 
3. A higher M provides a higher incentive to contribute to the group account because the benefit 
of contributing is higher. 
By explicitly telling the subjects the incentives, the subjects had a better understanding of the 
benefits to cooperating. And with repetition, subjects were able to learn what a difference having 
a higher MPCR made and thus we saw higher investments and contributions in sequence two. By 
educating the public on the benefits of improving public goods (e.g., improving clean air, 
national defense, and roads and highways) and what a difference is made when everyone 
contributes, people will understand why it is necessary to invest and contribute and be more 
motivated to do so.  
For example, with the road safety example used earlier, people of a community might not be 
aware of what road conditions need to be improved on. By explicitly indicating the projects that 
can be made possible with the community’s contributions (e.g., traffic signal installations, 
pedestrian crossing installations, and guide posts installations), people may be more incentivized 
to cooperate to better their community because they now have a clearer understanding of what 
their contributions go towards. 
3)  Publish a public record of community contributions 
I had found that in rematched sessions, subjects tended to do worse in sequence two if 
they did not do well in sequence one. On the other hand, in fixed sessions, total profits almost 
always increased from sequence one to sequence two. This observation is consistent with five of 
the studies in Andreoni and Croson (2008) where more cooperation among partners was found 
compared to cooperation among strangers. These experiments by Andreoni and Croson were 
meant to examine the differing results from Andreoni (1988) and Croson (1996). James 
Andreoni’s (1988) study found that Strangers (rematched groups) did significantly better than 
Partners (fixed groups) and Croson (1996) found the opposite. However, in all these 
experiments, there was no endogenous decision making or dynamic links.  
The observation that Partners tend to do better can be an indication that when subjects 
know how cooperative their group members are (instead of starting new with different group 
members whose investment and contribution patterns are unfamiliar) and can collectively 
determine their investment levels, subjects are more comfortable with their costly decisions. I 
propose an annual publication outlining a community’s contributions towards the productivity of 
a public good. In this case, people will be given feedback on their community’s willingness to 
contribute in the future and they would be more comfortable donating or contributing when they 
know the people they are directly benefiting. It can be argued that this can increase free-riding 
behavior because one might think others’ contributions are sufficient and cease their own 
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contributions, but the results from this experiment show that with feedback and endogenous 
contribution productivity, subjects are willing to cooperate and free-riding is less common than 
with exogenous taxation. 
5.3 Future Experiments 
 In the future, I would like to incorporate communication to see if results are consistent 
with Isaac and Walker (1988) who found that communication was extremely effective in aiding 
groups to achieve optimal outcomes. In my version, subjects did not communicate with one 
another but were given feedback of the group’s investment for that round; the feedback and the 
investment stage inexplicitly indicates group members’ willingness to cooperate (i.e., a high 
investment indicates group members are probably interested in contributing, otherwise they 
would be wasting their endowment). For a future experiment, instead of indirect communication, 
I would like to see the effects of direct communication between subjects (via chat).  
Another modification I suggest is using different group sizes as a treatment. Marwell and 
Ames (1979) did not find a significant difference between small groups’ productivity and large 
groups’ productivity. However, the endogenous contribution productivity in my experiment 
makes the setting more complicated, thus we may see different results with the group size 
treatment. 
Lastly, another suggestion would be to use experienced subjects, similar to Marwell and 
Ames (1981) who invited subjects who already participated to participate again. This suggestion 
is because there was a strong learning effect in my experiment, and I would like to see if the 
subjects are able to get closer to the social optimum with even more repetition. 
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Appendix A: Experiment Instructions 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making. Decisions result in monetary payoffs paid in cash at 
the end of the experiment. The payments are compensation for the time and effort put into 
making decisions. The experiment lasts about 90 minutes. 
 
Please do not talk to others during the experiment. If you have a question, raise your hand, and 
an experimenter will assist you. 
 
The experiment consists of two tasks. We will explain Task 1 now and explain Task 2 later. 
 
Task 1 is the “Investment and Contribution Game.” The best way to understand the Investment 
and Contribution Game is to first understand the “Contribution Game.” Once everyone is 
comfortable with that, we will add an investment stage. 
 
In the Contribution Game, 4 people in a group are each given 10 lab dollars (LD; 1 LD = 0.1 
USD) by the experimenter. Each person must decide how much of his/her 10 LD to contribute to 
the group account (any amounts not contributed are simply kept by the person). Contributions to 
the group account benefit everyone in the group because each person’s payoff is: 
 
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 10 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 0.5 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
 
Contributing more to the group account decreases the amount that someone keeps for him/herself 
(which is equal to 10 – contribution), but it also increases the sum of contributions, and 0.5 times 
the sum of contributions is a part of everyone’s payoff. Therefore, contributing more costs the 
individual, but helps the group as a whole. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that Al, Brenda, Charlie and Diana all contribute nothing. How much 
does each receive as a payoff? 
 
Answer: Sum of contributions = 0. Al’s payoff = 10 – 0 + 0.5*0 = 10. Similarly, Brenda, 
Charlie and Diana all receive payoffs of 10. 
 
Example 2:  Suppose that Al, Brenda, Charlie and Diana all contribute 10. How much does 
each receive as a payoff? 
 
Answer: Sum of contributions = 40. Al’s payoff = 10 – 10 + 0.5*40 = 20. Similarly, 
Brenda, Charlie and Diana all receive payoffs of 20. 
 
Example 3:  Suppose that Al contributes 0, Brenda and Charlie each contribute 5 and Diana 
contributes 10. How much does each receive as a payoff? 
 
Answer:  Sum of contributions = 20. Al’s payoff = 10 – 0 + 0.5*20 = 20. Brenda’s payoff = 
10 – 5 + 0.5*20 = 15. Similarly, Charlie’s payoff = 15. Diana’s payoff = 10 – 10 + 0.5*20 = 10. 
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*Notice that Al contributed less than Diana and received a higher payoff. But if everyone 
contributes nothing, no one makes any money (see Example 1).* 
The size of the “multiplier” (which has so far been 0.5) is important because it determines the 
benefit of contributions. A higher multiplier gives contributions a higher benefit.  
 
Example 4:  Consider the same contributions as Example 3, but suppose that the multiplier 
(M) is 0.75 instead of 0.5. How much does each person receive as a payoff? 
 
Answer:  Sum of contributions = 20. Al’s payoff = 10 – 0 + 0.75*20 = 25. Brenda’s payoff 
= 10 – 5 + 0.75*20 = 20. Similarly, Charlie’s payoff = 20. Diana’s payoff = 10 – 10 + 0.75*20 = 
15. 
 
This ends our explanation of the Contribution Game. Questions? Now is a great time to ask! 
 
For Task 1, you are going to play a repeated Investment and Contribution Game. Specifically, 
prior to playing a Contribution Game in which you will choose contribution amounts, you will be 
able to spend (invest) some of your money (in) increasing your group’s M. The whole process 
will be repeated multiple times. Here is how the repeated Investment and Contribution Game 
works: 
 
1. Over the computer network, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 4 that will 
remain fixed for 10 rounds of decision-making. You will not know which other people in 
the room are in your group. 
2. Your group’s M at the start of round 1 will be 0.30. Moving forward, the value of M will 
depend on how much your group invests in increasing M. Your group will have a chance 
to increase M at the start of each round. At the start of each of rounds 2 – 10, the value of 
M will be whatever it was at the end of the previous round.   
3. At the start of each round, each person in your group will receive 10 LD.  
4. Each round will begin with a vote among your group members over how many LD (an 
amount between 0 and 10, inclusive) each person in your group will invest in increasing 
M. 
5. Here is how the voting works: Each person in your group submits a whole number 
between 0 and 10. Your group’s investment in M is the average of the 2 middle votes, 
and M increases by 0.01*investment. Thus, if M is 0.30 and the votes are and 1, 3, 5, and 
7, investment will be 4, and M will increase by 0.04. Each person will have 6 LD left 
after investing 4 of his/her 10 LD. 
6. Next, your group will play a Contribution Game with starting amounts of money equal to 
what is left from 10LD after the group’s investment in M. For example, if 4 LD was 
invested in M, everyone will begin the Contribution Game with 6 LD. The value of M 
will be whatever was determined by the voting process (M = 0.34 in 5. above). The 
Contribution Game will be just like the one already described. Everyone chooses a 
contribution to the group account (up to 1 digit after the decimal point allowed), and 
contributions benefit everyone in the group. Each person’s payoff from the round will be 
their payoff in the contribution game: 
 
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 10 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑀 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
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 Specifically, payoff = 10 – 4 – contribution + 0.34 * sum of contributions in the example 
 that we have been developing, or payoff = 6 – contribution + 0.34 * sum of 
 contributions. If, in a particular round, your group chooses to invest 10 LD in increasing 
 M, your group members will have no money left at the start of the contribution stage. 
 Your group members should simply contribute “0” in that round in order to proceed to 
 the next round. 
7. The investment and contribution process will be repeated for 10 rounds. Remember, M 
builds from round to round, so your investment in M “stays with you” as the rounds 
proceed. 
8. At the end of the 10 rounds, your 10 payoffs will be added up to determine your earnings 
from Task 1. We will then provide instructions for Task 2. 
 
After Task 2 is complete, you will be asked to provide some demographic and contact 
information. Your final earnings will be the sum of your earnings from Task 1 and Task 2. 
Payments will be made in a private manner. 
 
Questions? 
 
Example of Task 1:  Suppose that 4 players begin round 4 with M = 0.46, their votes are 2, 3, 5 
and 6, and they all contribute 4. At the end of round 4, what will be their M, and payoffs from 
round 4? 
 
Answer: Investment = 4. M = 0.5. Payoffs from round 4 = 10 – 4 – 4 + 0.5*16 = 10. Note 
that one of the benefits of round 4 is that M is now higher for round 5 (M = 0.5). Suppose that in 
round 5, investment = 0 and everyone contributes 8, payoffs = 10 – 8 + 0.5*32 = 18. 
 
Some notes on the incentives to invest in M and contribute to the group account: 
 
1. In the early (late) rounds, the incentive to invest in increasing M is high (low) because 
there are more (fewer) future rounds during which you can benefit from having a higher 
M. 
2. A higher M does not on its own increase your payoff. A higher M is helpful only if 
people subsequently contribute significant amounts. 
3. A higher M provides a higher incentive to contribute to the group account because the 
benefit of contributing is higher. 
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Appendix B: Task 2 Instructions for Fixed Groups 
Instructions – Task 2 
 
You will complete another 10 round Investment and Contribution Game, which will proceed 
exactly the same way as in Task 1. Your group will be the same as it was for Task 1. 
 
Questions? 
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Appendix C: Task 2 Instructions for Rematched Groups 
Instructions – Task 2 
 
You will complete another 10 round Investment and Contribution Game, which will proceed 
exactly the same way as in Task 1. However, your group will NOT be the same as it was for 
Task 1. You will be randomly re-matched into a new group of 4. Some of your new group 
members may be the same as in Task 1, but some will probably be different. 
 
Questions? 
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Appendix D: Experiment Screenshots 
 
 
Figure A.1: The voting screen for the investment stage. 
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Figure A.2: The feedback screen from the investment stage. 
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Figure A.3: The contribution stage. 
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Figure A.4: The feedback screen from the contribution stage. 
 
